Thursday, Dec 19th, 2024. 15:00 am.
Venue: Room 4 (Carlos Santamaria).
Fregeanism and Metaphorical Proper Names
Eros Corazza (ILCLI)
Abstract:
What Frege would say about the metaphorical use of proper names? In this essay we explore how Frege could deal with the metaphorical use of, e.g. “Napoleon” in the utterance of a sentence like “Napoleon just arrived” with the speaker’s intent to refer to the arrival of his friend Bill. In this case “Napoleon” is used in a metaphorical way. Our aim is merely to show how Frege could handle these cases without, though, proposing a detailed theory about the metaphorical use of proper names. Our aim is merely exegetical. We, in short, try to show how Frege could be understood or amended to deal with cases like this. Whether the Fregean theory, as we understand it, is the correct one is an open question we will not deal with.
Frege and the transmission model of communication
Kepa Korta (ILCLI & Philosophy Department)
Abstract:
It is a commonplace of the philosophy of language that Frege’s pragmatics, understood as a theory of communication, responds to the conception generally dubbed the “code,” “message,” or “transmission” model, according to which successful communication requires the identity between the thought expressed by the speaker in uttering a sentence and the thought grasped by the hearer. There is also a general consensus on the fact that indexicals and demonstratives pose singular problems for Frege’s theory of meaning as sense and reference. The aim of this work is to examine Frege’s alleged commitment to the transmission model in either its pure or impure versions for specific communicative purposes or for a logically perfect language. We conclude that, despite appearances to the contrary, Frege did not hold the transmission model of communication.
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