Language, Action and Thought

The Knowledge Argument poses a challenge to physicalism, contending that firsthand experiences yield knowledge beyond the reach of scientific understanding. The argument is typically interpreted as pointing to qualitative aspects of our experience as the source of the problem. This paper challenges the received view, introducing a novel approach. We argue that the core issue is informational, centering on a specific understanding of `points of view' in semantic terms. This approach shifts the focus from qualitative aspects to the first-person informational content of experiences.Scientific inquiry aims to understand our world fully, yet it faces the challenge of reconciling comprehensive knowledge of the world with uncertainties resolvable only through specific experiences. We argue that conscious experiences inherently provide first-person information. Drawing on recent discussion on first-personal thought, we show that phenomenal information is special and articulate why it cannot be deduced from scientific information. This uniqueness derives not from the necessity of some sort of acquaintance with the experience —or some other kind of privileged location in logical space— for its acquisition. Instead, its distinctiveness lies in conscious experiences informing us not only about the actual world but also about our own location or perspective within it.