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"Relevance & Constructions: Towards unity in language science?"
Seminar on Language and Communication
I will outline a new idea: that the synthesis of two highly productive but distinct sets of ideas can generate an integrated paradigm for language science. First, Relevance Theory describes the fundamental principles of human communication, and the socio-cognitive capacities of mind that underpin them. Second, Construction Grammar treats grammar as being fully constituted by learned pairings between form and ‘meaning’. Both these frameworks have proved highly, and have arguably begun to supersede other frameworks (neo-Gricean approaches to pragmatics; Chomskyan generative grammar) as the dominant frameworks in their subfields. I will sketch how these two frameworks might be natural bedfellows, and hence how their synthesis might provide unified and motivated perspectives on major issues in language science.
VIDEOS
ILCLI Videos
Channel info
Science & Technology, Education
Linguistics, Reflexive Content, Perry, Iñigo Valero, Grice, sex pluralism, Miguel Ángel Sebastián, Tomás Barrero, Relevance Theory, Eros Corazza, slurs, Predelli, Frege, Philosophy of Language, Sennet, register, indexicals, Luis Fernández Moreno, Joshua Shepherd, representationalism, philosophy of action, stereotypes, Philosophy, First person representation, derogative speech acts, Stefano, Classical Essentialist Theory of Kinds, Shannon Bain, Meaning, philosophy;, Exceptives, Sobel sequences, María Cerezo, Hilary Putnam, Philosophy of language, indexical, Semantics, Natural Kinds, Analytical Philosophy, Language Action and Thought, Mikhail Kissine, Essentialism, Natural Kind Semantics, Maria de Ponte, phenomenology, Prior, philosophy, Construction Grammar, Stephen Neale, mention, Thom Scott-Phillips, ILCLI, Use Conditions, taboo, Stefano Predelli, philosophy of language, Eleonora Orlando, Mean, Modal Normativism, Stanley Peters, theoretical terms, observational terms, Nausicaa Pouscoulous, Theory of Concept Lattices, On Sense and Reference, Adam Sennet, Seminar on Language and Commun, Begriffsschrift, Eleonora, of, language;, Paderewski-like examples, Mill, referentialism

ILCLI Videos
Shannon Bain, "Reflexive Content, Use Conditions, and Modal Normativism." [8-03-2023]

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Abstract: We try to develop a more complete story of the content available given an uttered expression's conventional meaning than the orthodox propositional account typically allows. Our account escapes some semantic puzzles and respects the meaningfulness, and thus the contentfulness, of not strictly or exclusively truth-conditionally explicable utterances. We start with John Perry & Kepa Korta’s multi-content approach which addresses the semantic paradoxes by positing a continuum of reflexive contents alongside official referential content. Reflexive content can profitably be seen as a specific flavor of use-conditional content. We go on to integrate reflexive content into an augmented version of Stefano Predelli’s use-conditional framework for handling non-truth-conditional aspects of conventional meaning, or what he calls bias. Finally we consider in-depth how the mechanics we’ve developed along the way can put a different spin on some neo-pragmatist discussions of modality, particularly Amie Thomasson’s recent normativist approach to metaphysical modality. ------------------------ An ILCLI Seminar on Language and Communication, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought ( https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home ). Supported by: Basque Government (IT1612-22). Spanish Government (PID2019-106078GB-I00 (MCI/AEI/FEDER, UE)). ------------------------ 00:00:00 - Talk 00:45:26 - Q&AScience & Technology
Modal Normativism, Philosophy, Philosophy of language, Reflexive Content, Shannon Bain, Use Conditions
Iñigo Valero, "'Is Sex Binary? A False Dilemma and Sex Pluralism" [8-03-2023]

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Abstract: Current debates on the nature of human biological sex often revolve around the question “is sex binary?”. In this paper I argue that framing the debate in these terms is problematic in two ways. First, this either-or-question introduces a false dilemma that unduly restricts the scope of relevant possibilities. I argue, thus, that neither the positive nor the negative answer to this question is satisfactory and that a more nuanced characterization is required. Second, I argue that this framework presupposes sex monism, that is, the view according to which there is only one appropriate or valid concept of sex. By drawing an analogy with the species concept, I suggest, on the contrary, that sex pluralism is a preferable and more fruitful conceptual framework to work with. ------------------------ An ILCLI Open Seminar, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought ( https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home ). Supported by: Basque Government (IT1612-22). Spanish Government (PID2019-106078GB-I00 (MCI/AEI/FEDER, UE)). ------------------------ 00:00 - Talk 36:34 - Q&AScience & Technology
Iñigo Valero, Philosophy, sex pluralism
Nausicaa Pouscoulous, "Ironic speakers, vigilant children" [11-03-2022]

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A Workshop on Experimental Pragmatics, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought ( https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home ). Supported by: Basque Government (IT1032-16). Spanish Government PID2019-106078GB-I00 (MCI/AEI/FEDER, UE). ------------------------ 0:00:00 - Talk 0:40:55 - Q&QScience & Technology
Nausicaa Pouscoulous
Mikhail Kissine, "Pragmatic processing and interpretation outputs" [11-03-2022]

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Abstract: Much of experimental research in pragmatics focuses on determining to which extent this or that pragmatic process involves Theory of Mind, with some researchers questioning whether all pragmatics is necessarily rooted in the ability to represent other people’s communicative intentions. Independently of one's favourite model, however, this research paradigm presupposes that pragmatic processes map on a typology of pragmatic outputs, such as implicature, metaphor, indirect speech act or irony. This way of thinking conflates the rational reconstruction of pragmatic processing as an inferential link between two syntactic strings (what is said and the putatively derived meaning) with the actual interpretation process. I will present experimental data that supports the alternative view, according to which pragmatic processes and the contextual resources on which they are based depend on contextual demands and individual characteristics, in a fashion orthogonal to typologies of pragmatic outputs. ------------------------ A Workshop on Experimental Pragmatics, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought ( https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home ). Supported by: Basque Government (IT1032-16). Spanish Government PID2019-106078GB-I00 (MCI/AEI/FEDER, UE). ------------------------ 0:00:00 - Talk 0:43:43 - Q&QScience & Technology
Mikhail Kissine
María Cerezo, Frege's doctrines on sense (Sinn) [17/05/2022]

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Abstract: In this talk I will offer an interpretation of Frege's semantic doctrines and of their evolution from the Begriffschrift to Der Gedanke. Special attention will be paid to the evolution of the notion of sense (Sinn) and the role of context in Frege's doctrines. I will also try to point out some tensions in Frege's conception of semantic relations. My strategy will be to focus on the way in which Frege conceives of temporal expressions (tense, temporal indexicals, and so on), reference to time and time as part of the expression of thought. Ultimately, I intend to show that the difficulties raised by these expressions are merely a particular instance/s of more general problems in Frege's doctrines. Some samples of recent literature on Frege's views on temporal indexicals will also be discussed. ------------------------ A talk of the ILCLI Seminar on Language and Communication, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home ). Supported by: Basque Government (IT1032-16). Spanish Government PID2019-106078GB-I00 (MCI/AEI/FEDER, UE). ------------------------ 0:00:00 - Talk 0:56:50 - Q&A 1:31:34 - EndScience & Technology
Frege, ILCLI, María Cerezo, philosophy of language
Luis Fernández Moreno, On theoretical and observational terms in Putnam’s theory [17/05/2022]

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Abstract: A usual objection put forward against some versions of the causal theory of reference is that it cannot explain the reference changes that terms may undergo. Hilary Putnam is considered as one of the main advocates of that theory. In this talk I will focus on the classic formulation of Putnam’s theory, contained in his articles of the first half of the seventies of the last century, and I will examine the question as to whether Putnam’s theory makes reference change possible. On this matter I will take into consideration the reference of theoretical and observational terms. ------------------------ A talk of the ILCLI Seminar on Language and Communication, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home ). Supported by: Basque Government (IT1032-16). Spanish Government PID2019-106078GB-I00 (MCI/AEI/FEDER, UE). ------------------------ 0:00:00 - Talk 0:20:00 - Q&AScience & Technology
Hilary Putnam, ILCLI, Luis Fernández Moreno, observational terms, theoretical terms
Adam Sennet, Thoughts about the Ethics of Use and Mention [13/05/2022]

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Abstract: Anderson and Lepore have used a puzzle about slurring language to argue that the general offensiveness of slurs is grounded in their form, not their meaning. If correct, this undermines a great deal of motivation for current views regarding the semantics of slurring language. The puzzle stems from the observation that the derogatory properties of slur term seem to be present even in indirect and quoted contexts. The paper will consider the other cases of quoted offensive language to consider the soundness of their argument and will try to offer some preliminary thoughts about the ethics of referring to rather than using, offensive language. ------------------------ A talk of the ILCLI Open Seminar, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home). Supported by: Basque Government (IT1032-16). Spanish Government PID2019-106078GB-I00 (MCI/AEI/FEDER, UE)). ------------------------ 0:00:00 - Talk 0:40:21 - Q&AEducation
philosophy of language, Adam Sennet, slurs, mention
Joshua Shepherd, Knowledge and control [13/05/2022]

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Abstract: Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental, and one common way action theorists have attempted to explain this is with reference to control. The idea, in short, is that intentional action implicates control, and control precludes accidentality. But in virtue of what, exactly, would exercising control over an action suffice to make it non-accidental in whatever sense is required for the action to be intentional? Some have recently argued that control is non-accidental in virtue of requiring knowledge. I will argue that knowledge-centered accounts of control do not work, and that it is rather control that explains the presence of knowledge in intentional action. ------------------------ A talk of the ILCLI Open Seminar, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home). Supported by: Basque Government (IT1032-16). Spanish Government PID2019-106078GB-I00 (MCI/AEI/FEDER, UE)). ------------------------ 0:00:00 - Talk 0:39:50 - Q&AEducation
philosophy, philosophy of action, Joshua Shepherd, ILCLI
Javier Belastegui, Natural Kind Semantics for a Classical Essentialist Theory of Kinds [09/03/2022]

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Abstract: Essentialism, as defended for instance by (Ellis, 2001), (Bird, 2015) and (Lowe, 2004), is one of the main theories of natural kinds. In this talk I will introduce a new formal semantics for an essentialist theory of kinds formulated in classical (and non-modal) two-sorted monadic first-order logic. Instead of the standard semantics, I will make use of R. Wille’s algebraic Theory of Concept Lattices. Whereas the former represents kinds simply as sets of objects (and in the modal case, as functions from worlds to sets), the latter represents them as pairs of sets (A, B), where A contains the members of the kind and B contains the attributes that form the general essence of the kind. The semantics will be shown to be complete with respect to the theory and will be compared to other formal approaches, such as (Thomason, 1969), (Martin, 1997) and (Freund, 2019). In contrast to the first two, the current approach captures the essentialist membership conditions of kinds. In contrast to the third approach, it gives a more nuanced account of the hierarchical structure of the specificity relations between kinds. Based on these reasons, I argue that this approach is preferable as an explanation of natural kind essentialism. ------------------------ A talk of the Seminar on Logic and Foundations of Symbolic Systems, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home). Supported by: Basque Government (IT1032-16). Spanish Government PID2019-106078GB-I00 (MCI/AEI/FEDER, UE)).Science & Technology
Classical Essentialist Theory of Kinds, Natural Kind Semantics, Essentialism, Theory of Concept Lattices
Thom Scott-Phillips, Relevance & Constructions: Towards unity in language science?[01/26/2022]

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Abstract: I will outline a new idea: that the synthesis of two highly productive but distinct sets of ideas can generate an integrated paradigm for language science. First, Relevance Theory describes the fundamental principles of human communication, and the socio-cognitive capacities of mind that underpin them. Second, Construction Grammar treats grammar as being fully constituted by learned pairings between form and ‘meaning’. Both these frameworks have proved highly, and have arguably begun to supersede other frameworks (neo-Gricean approaches to pragmatics; Chomskyan generative grammar) as the dominant frameworks in their subfields. I will sketch how these two frameworks might be natural bedfellows, and hence how their synthesis might provide unified and motivated perspectives on major issues in language science. ------------------------ A talk of the Seminar on Language and Communication, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home). Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16) and Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) and PID2019-106078GB-I00 (MCI/AEI/FEDER, UE)).Science & Technology
Construction Grammar, ILCLI, Language Action and Thought, Philosophy of language, Relevance Theory, Seminar on Language and Commun, Thom Scott-Phillips
Chris Genovesi, "Metaphor and the psycholinguistic strawman" [13/09/2020]

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ABSTRACT: Grice did not say much about metaphor. What he did say followed from his treatment of conversational implicatures. It is argued by some theorists that Grice intended to offer a rational reconstruction. However, there is a multi-source trend which opts to understand Grice’s remarks on metaphor as unabashedly psychological. The psychologized version of Grice’s theory runs in serial: compute what is said; reject what is said as contextually inappropriate; run pragmatic processing to recover contextually appropriate meaning. Citing data from reaction time studies, critics of the psychologized version reject Grice’s account as psychologically implausible. Critics have developed models that do not rely on serial processing, or input from literal meaning. I argue that the serial processing model and its criticisms turn on a strawman of Grice’s account. I believe an alternative interpretation is available. On my account, the psychologized version of the Gricean model requires that literal language play a role in the construction of the metaphorical meaning. For example, I contend that a broadly Gricean model can accept parallel processing in metaphor comprehension. I highlight how my interpretation is broadly consistent with neurolinguistic research on metaphor comprehension. ------------------------ A talk of the Seminar on Language and Communication, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home). Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16), Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE)) and (PID2019-106078GB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033)Education
philosophy;, philosophy, of, language;, Grice
Adam Sennet, "Sobel sequences as a test case for static vs. dynamic Semantics." [23/05/2019]

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ABSTRACT: Static semantics treats sentences (at contexts) as expressing truth conditions/propositions/information and constructs a theory of conversational update as a matter of pragmatics. Dynamic semantics treats sentences (at contexts) as expressing functions from contexts to contexts (so sentences affect contexts and have their truth conditions affected by contexts). Justifying one framework over the other has been a difficult matter but modals, counterfactuals in particular, exhibit conversational dynamics that has promised to support one over the other. The classic cases for consideration are Sobel Sequences (SSs) and Reverse Sobel Sequences (RSSs). The most promising representative of the dynamic approach is von Fintel’s dynamic semantics for subjunctive conditionals. We argue that overall considerations, despite initial appearances, favour the static approach. ------------------------ A talk of the Workshop on Language and Communication, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home). Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16) and Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE)).Education
philosophy, philosophy of language, Adam Sennet, Sennet, Sobel sequences, Semantics
Maria de Ponte, "Prior and the essential indexicals." [23/05/2019]

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ABSTRACT: Arthur Prior argued that differences in the utterances used to express emotions such as relief were key for an account of those emotional responses to events. He did so, most famously, in his paper "Thank goodness that's over" (1959). In my opinion, Prior anticipated there many of the central claims John Perry made almost twenty years later (1977, 1979). Perry famously claimed that there are some deep and important roles indexicals play in thought and action, and to do so, he made use of well-known examples. I focus on the "tardy professor" case and compare it with Prior's scenario. I argue that both Prior and Perry are presenting problems generated by cases of substitution raising a difference in cognitive significance, and I show how Prior's scenario can easily be accounted for within a Perry-inspired framework, with no commitment to any essentially indexical thought. To do this, I briefly consider the influence of Castañeda in the two authors, and I conclude my presentation with a short discussion of the ontological implications of Prior's scenario. ------------------------ A talk of the Workshop on Language and Communication, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home). Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16) and Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE)).Education
philosophy, philosophy of language, Maria de Ponte, Prior, indexicals
Eros Corazza, "Revisiting Millianism." [24/05/2019]

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ABSTRACT: Mill argued that names denote but do not connote. He also claimed that names can be used attributively, like ‘York’ in “This is York”. There is, thus, a tension. For, in such a construal we attribute to the referent picked out by the demonstrative ‘this’ the property of carrying the name ‘York’ and, therefore, that the name connotes the referent as the bearer of the name. I will show how Perry’s critical referentialism, in distinguishing between the reflexive content and the official or referential content of an utterance, helps us to dissolve this tension without having to dismiss Mill’s claims. ------------------------ A talk of the Workshop on Language and Communication, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home). Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16) and Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE)).Education
philosophy, philosophy of language, Eros Corazza, Mill, referentialism, Perry
Stephen Neale, "Means, means, means." [24/05/2019]

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A talk of the Workshop on Language and Communication, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home). Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16) and Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE)).Education
philosophy, philosophy of language, Stephen Neale, Mean, Meaning
Stefano Predelli, "A stranger in the Alps: slurs, register, and taboo." [01/02/2019]

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ABSTRACT: I discuss the relationships between two distinct dimensions in the use of charged terms, such as slurs or coarse expressions: their standard (non-truth-conditional) meaning, responsible for effects such as derogation or denigration, and their status as taboo words. My test cases involve euphemisms or codes, which arguably aim at preserving effects of the former type while avoiding the tokening of taboo forms. I contrast classic non-displacement tests with resistance to displacement by pure quotation, and I pause on the significance of taboo for the interface between syntax and semantics. ------------------------ A talk of the Seminar on Language and Communication, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home). Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16) and Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE)).Education
philosophy, philosophy of language, slurs, register, taboo, Stefano, Predelli, Stefano Predelli
Eleonora Orlando, "Group slurs, stereotypes, and derogative speech acts." [01/02/2019]

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ABSTRACT: The talk will be about paradigmatic group slur-words, i.e., expressions that are prima facie associated with the expression of a contemptuous attitude concerning a certain group of people identified in terms of its origin or descent, race, sexual orientation, religion, habits or ways of living, etc. My purpose is twofold: (i) explaining their expressive meaning dimension in terms of a version of stereotype semantics; (ii) analysing their most common, derogatory uses in terms of a speech act theory. With regard to the first objective, I will suggest that their expressive meaning can be conceived of as a socially determined normative stereotype, namely, a complex concept constituted by an open list of descriptive, thick and purely evaluative ones, with an encoded negative global value. As for the second objective, I will argue that their most common, derogatory uses involve a derogatory intention, namely, the kind of communicative intention characteristic of a sub-kind of speech acts with derogative force. This expressive component is thus pragmatic, that is, not part of their conventional meaning. In sum, I will conclude that paradigmatic slur-words, semantically linked to normative stereotypes, are typically used to make derogative speech acts. ------------------------ A talk of the Seminar on Language and Communication, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home). Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16) and Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE)).Education
philosophy, philosophy of language, slurs, stereotypes, derogative speech acts, Eleonora Orlando, Eleonora
Miguel Ángel Sebastián, ""First person representation in experience." [11/01/2019]

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ABSTRACT: According to representationalism, phenomenally conscious states (PCSs) are representational states. Representationalism offers an interesting prospect in the project of naturalizing consciousness on the assumption that representation can itself be naturalized. Unfortunately, not all representational states are PCSs. If representationalism is to succeed, the difference with non-PCSs should better be a representational difference, a difference in adequacy conditions. I argue that in order to look for such a difference we should focus on what the experience conveys over and above the primary object of experience. The candidates in the literature are the subject of experience as such and the experience itself. I argue that the experience concerns the former but not the later and spell out in what sense the subject is concerned experience: PCSs are core de se representational states. This explains the perspectival nature of experience, accommodate the phenomenological observation, and can straightforwardly explain the mistake made by those who, like Hume, have called this feature into question. On the downside, current naturalistic theories of mental content cannot characterize such representational states, thereby jeopardizing the naturalistic prospect. ------------------------ A talk of the ILCLI Open Seminar, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home). Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16) and Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE)).Education
philosophy, philosophy of language, Miguel Ángel Sebastián, First person representation, representationalism, phenomenology
Adam Sennet, "Prospects for a unified theory of slurs." [16/11/2018]

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ABSTRACT: In this paper we argue for a methodological point and a related point about theories of the pragmatics and semantics of slurring terms. First, in theorizing about slurs, there is much to be gained by considering a wider variety of slurring terms than philosophers usually consider . We try to demonstrate this point by looking at three verbs, at least two of which are slurring verbs. Second, under plausible assumptions, none of the most familiar views that are intended to explain the derogatory nature of slurring terms generalize well to the verbs in question. The three verbs we will use as examples are ‘to gyp’, ‘to jew’ and ‘to bitch’. They are worth considering in their own right, and we think our investigation of them reveals interesting complex features of the phenomenon of slurring. ------------------------ A talk of the Seminar on Language and Communication, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home). Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16) and Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE)).Education
philosophy, philosophy of language, Adam Sennet, slurs
Tomás Barrero, "The essential indexical and the double life of names." [28/09/2019]

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ABSTRACT: John Perry and David Lewis famously claimed that there is some deep and interesting phenomenon implicit to the use of indexicals. In The Inessential Indexical, Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever beg to differ. On close inspection every alleged example of essential indexicality is for them another run-of-the-mill Fregean case of generic opacity. They argue, moreover, that Perry’s concerns about the Fregean explanation of indexicals are instances of Kripke’s arguments against any descriptive theory of naming. After reviewing their justification for that view, I show that indexical scenarios and cases of opacity are significantly different, though this has no bearing on traditional arguments against descriptive theories of naming. Within a non-Fregean image of reference inspired by Kripke and Kaplan we can produce Paderewski-like examples with names but not with indexicals, so the view that indexicals and attitudes interact in a special way can be vindicated. ------------------------ A talk of the Seminar on Language and Communication, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought (https://latgroup.wixsite.com/home). Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16) and Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE)).Education
philosophy, philosophy of language, Tomás Barrero, indexical, Paderewski-like examples
Ángeles Eraña, "The rationality of delusions"

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ABSTRACT: There has been some debate regarding the epistemic status of delusions. Not only is there no agreement regarding whether delusions have any epistemic value, but also whether they are beliefs (or, for that matter, doxastic attitudes at all). We will give reasons to take delusions to be beliefs and will argue that they have an important rational aspect. Delusions do not only help in making sense of unusual and powerful experiences (Bortonlini and Mameli 2012) –and thus allow us to reason properly-, but more importantly they allow subjects to efficiently convey information and thus be part of social settings. Even though it has been argued that this latter characteristic of delusions is a psychological virtue, we will show that it is also an epistemic one. Our argument will rest on the following tenets: effective communication is an adaptive feature of human beings. In accordance with Mercier and Sperber (2011), we hold that reasoning has evolved and persisted mainly because it enhances the former adaptive feature. If this is the case, and we accept that the main goals of argumentation are social, then we can understand a sense in which being rational involves being able to function in social settings. If this is the case, and given that rationality is an epistemic virtue, we conclude that delusions are epistemically virtuous. ------------------------ A talk of the ILCLI Open Seminar, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought. Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16) and Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE)).Science & Technology
Philosophy
John Perry, "The most read passage from Frege"

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Frege's "On Sense and Reference" has been required reading in analytical philosophy of language courses since before World War II, and this practice continues into the present century. If we assume that most students make it through the first paragraph, it must be the most read passage from Frege. But the paragraph is a mess. He starts by discussing the difference between "A=A" and "A=B", the problem he treated years earlier in the Begriffsschrift. He purports to criticize his Begriffsshrift solution, but he states it inaccurately and unfairly. He goes on to say the problem he discussed in the Begriffschrift really isn't a problem, but it is hard to understand why. What is going on? I will argue that Frege is in the coils of the Error of Misplaced Information. (Jon Barwise and I called this a fallacy, but I don't want to accuse Frege of a fallacy.) If he avoids it he can solve all of his identity problems without adding the notorious section 8 to that work, and can add levels of sense and reference to his Begriffsschrift theory rather than starting over. A talk of the Seminar on Language and Communication, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought. Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16) and Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE)).Science & Technology
Begriffsschrift, Philosophy of Language, On Sense and Reference, Analytical Philosophy, Frege, Philosophy
Iñigo Valero, "Degrees of Naturalness: An Argument Against Dichotomical Accounts of Natural Kind"

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ABSTRACT: Contemporary discussion on natural kinds has it that a satisfactory account of natural kinds should provide the criteria to draw a sharp borderline between natural and nonnatural kinds (e.g. natural kind essentialists, for instance, consider that the criterion for natural kindness is possessing an essence that determines the necessary and sufficient conditions for kind membership). In this paper, I contend that such dichotomical accounts are problematic in various ways. Either they are too restrictive and exclude many scientific categories that we would like, presumably, to keep calling ‘natural’ or, instead, they fail to provide solid criteria to draw the ontological distinction it is intended. I suggest, thus, to adopt a gradual notion of naturalness that enables us not only to assess whether a kind is natural or not, but, more importantly, to determine whether a kind is more or less natural than another. ------------------------ A talk of the ILCLI Open Seminar, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought. Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16) and Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE)).Science & Technology
Philosophy, Iñigo Valero, Natural Kinds, ILCLI
Stanley Peters, "What do exceptives mean"

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ABSTRACT: In philosophy of language and linguistics, the prevailing view is that exceptive expressions function to save the truth of universal generalizations. Actual usage of English but and except reveals an interestingly different picture, beginning to be confirmed in psycholinguistic experiments. Exceptives occur also with non-universal generalizations, do not always save truth, and can exclude non-exceptional instances of a generalization. We present a simple, intuitively natural, formal theory of their meaning that shows how they function in general, including statements like "Imports have declined in most countries but China" and "Few countries but China can offer Egypt financial assistance and investment". ------------------------ A talk of the ILCLI Open Seminar, organized by the research group on Language, Action, and Thought. Supported by Basque Government (IT1032-16) and Spanish Government (FFI2015-63719-P (MINECO/FEDER, UE)).Education
Philosophy of Language, Linguistics, Exceptives, Stanley Peters

The research group on Language, Action, and Thought ---at the Institute of Logic, Cognition, Language and Information (ILCLI)--- mostly focuses on the Philosophy of Language and Mind as well as on the Philosophy of Action. Most of its members are philosophers but it also includes linguists, psychologists and logicians.
An important part of our research has evolved around Critical Pragmatics, a theory created and developed by some of us, with applications to the study of linguistic communication, and important assumptions and implications about thought and action.
During the last decade, we have received several grants from the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), the Basque Government and the Government of Spain.
Address: ILCLI. UPV/EHU. Carlos Santamaria Zentroa.
Elhuyar Plaza 2. 20018. Donostia