November 3, 2022
Venue: Carlos Santamaria Zentroa, room 2
Pragmatic processing and interpretation outputs
Mikhail Kissine (ULB)
Abstract:
Much of experimental research in pragmatics focuses on determining to which extent this or that pragmatic process involves Theory of Mind, with some researchers questioning whether all pragmatics is necessarily rooted in the ability to represent other people’s communicative intentions. Independently of one's favourite model, however, this research paradigm presupposes that pragmatic processes map on a typology of pragmatic outputs, such as implicature, metaphor, indirect speech act or irony. This way of thinking conflates the rational reconstruction of pragmatic processing as an inferential link between two syntactic strings (what is said and the putatively derived meaning) with the actual interpretation process. I will present experimental data that supports the alternative view, according to which pragmatic processes and the contextual resources on which they are based depend on contextual demands and individual characteristics, in a fashion orthogonal to typologies of pragmatic outputs.
Ironic speakers, vigilant children
Nausicaa Pouscoulous (UCL)
Abstract:
Young children are notoriously bad at understanding ironical statements. Unlike what has been shown for other pragmatic phenomena (e.g., various types of implicatures and meaning shifts), the onset of irony comprehension (between 4 and 6 years old) seems insensitive to task manipulation. In this talk we present an account of irony which sheds light on this late development.
Verbal irony characteristically involves the expression of a derogatory, dissociative attitude. The ironical speaker is not only stating a blatant falsehood or irrelevant proposition; she is also communicating her stance towards its epistemic status. The centrality of attitude recognition in irony understanding opens up the question of which cognitive abilities make it possible. Drawing on Wilson (2009), we provide a full-fledged account of the role of epistemic vigilance in irony understanding and suggest that it relies on the exercise of first- and second-order vigilance towards the content, the ironic speaker as well as the source of the irony.
The crucial role of epistemic vigilance, particularly second-order epistemic vigilance, can explain why irony comprehension is difficult for pre-schoolers and possibly even some adult populations.
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