Language, Action and Thought

Experimental philosophers cast doubt on philosophers’ claims about what is intuitive or common-sensical. They insist that tests and experimental studies should be performed in order to determine if the attitudes, intuitions, beliefs, actions and reactions of the folk coincide with the conjectures of philosophers. In this paper we discuss a recent study, in which Cova et al. call into question the prima facie tension postulated by aestheticists between (i) people’s endorsement of claims that one would expect subjectivists to endorse, such as de gustibus non est disputandum, and (ii) the fact that people very often behave as if they were objectivists or, at the very least, intersubjectivists (for instance, they dispute in situations in which disagreements about taste may arise, they criticise or praise ‘good’ or ‘bad’ taste, etc.).

Our paper follows in the heels of a previous one in which we have focused on another x-phi experiment that purports to test whether people perceive the story of The Ship of Theseus as a puzzle. In both cases, we argue, the experimental data fail to provide evidence about the relevant issues.